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he principal item on the agenda of the May 2nd meeting of the Council of EU finance 
ministers was the European Commission’s proposal for implementing Basel III into 
EU law, the so-called capital requirements Regulation and Directive (CRD IV). . In 
expressing his opposition to key elements of the Commission’s proposal, the British finance 
minister  reaffirmed  his  country’s  traditional  role  as  opponent  of  further  European 
integration. In defending the single market’s core principle of free competition, however, the 
UK’s position on this point is entirely correct, as long as minimum standards are respected. 
The Commission is proposing a cap on the level of capital that banks can hold, which is in 
clear violation of these principles. Moreover, the UK also rightly argued that the Basel III 
rules were being watered down. It is paradoxical that the country that is home to the largest 
financial centre in the EU, appears to be the one that is least in the hands of the banks. 
As the most important post-crisis measure aimed at ensuring sound prudential supervision 
of the banking sector, CRD IV specifies a stricter definition of capital, sets a minimum of Tier 
1 capital that all banks must hold and imposes additional capital buffers. But unlike the 
proposals of the Basel Committee, its sets no minimum level of core capital, but places a 
ceiling on risk-weighted capital. Moreover, it does not change the capital requirement for 
holdings of government bonds and mortgage loans contained in the current rules. 
In its present form, the Commission’s proposal leaves much to be desired. Firstly, although 
there is no strong argument in support of limiting the level of capital in a single market as 
long as minimum levels are respected, the European Commission has done just the opposite: 
it proposes maximum limits, without formally setting an absolute minimum. Through the 
risk-weighting of assets to calculate the minimum Tier 1 ratio, banks can mimic the rules 
through the use of internal models to calculate the levels of capital, or via the zero or low-
risk weightings for certain, but very important asset classes, such as government debt or 
mortgage loans, in the ratings-based approach. 
To give the member states some leeway, the Regulation proposes that member states may 
require banks to hold an additional systemic risk buffer for locally licensed banks, above the 
Tier 1 and Tier 2 ratios. To make things even more complicated, this facility is limited to up 
to 3%. Once above 3%, the authorisation of the European Commission is required, which is 
precisely what the UK government objects to.  
This is why a leverage ratio, or a minimum level of core capital to total assets, is all the more 
important. Such a ratio is, unlike the Tier 1 ratio, easy to calculate and understandable for a 
broader  public.  However,  the CRD IV  proposal  does not  set  a minimum,  but  leaves  the 
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question to be decided at a much later date, if at all. In addition, the definition of capital 
leaves much to be desired, and allows proportional consolidation of minority interest and 
double counting of capital in insurance undertakings, contrary to the provisions proposed in 
Basel III. 
The US authorities have for some time applied a leverage ratio and will certainly argue, as 
soon as the issue is raised in a transatlantic or even a G-20 context, that the EU has not 
consistently implemented Basel III. Hence it would be better to respect the original spirit of 
the Basel III proposals, rather than make too many exceptions. Setting correct rules now is all 
the more important given that the largest part of the proposal is an EU regulation, which 
means that it is directly applicable to all EU-licensed banks immediately upon adoption by 
the EU’s legislative bodies. 